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ABSTRACT 
  For some time, federal courts faced with unresolved questions of 
state law have been able to certify those questions to state courts for 
resolution. In the past half-century, certification practice has exploded. 
Nearly every state allows at least one federal court to certify questions 
to its state courts, and some federal courts exercise the option 
frequently. However, there is no analogous tool for state courts to 
certify questions of federal law to federal courts. This Note argues that 
the creation of such a tool would benefit both courts and litigants. Of 
course, the considerations motivating certification to state courts, such 
as Erie and abstention doctrines, are not equally present in the other 
direction. But many of the benefits of certification would be reciprocal, 
including enhanced uniformity, an increased sense of fairness to 
litigants, and institutional comity between courts. Given these benefits, 
this Note argues that there should be some give and take in certification 
practice. 
INTRODUCTION 
State courts are often called upon to answer questions of federal 
law. Since the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, many 
federal issues must be resolved in a state forum. It could be because 
the federal issue arises only as a defense to a state law claim,1 or 
because the parties lack Article III standing to bring their claims in 
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 1. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (“It is not 
enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action and asserts that 
the defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of the United States.”). 
MACY IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/17/2021  3:19 PM 
908  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:907 
federal court,2 or because the federal issue in a state law claim is not 
sufficiently substantial.3 The possibilities are numerous. In other 
circumstances, the federal courts may be accessible, but the litigants 
may prefer to resolve their claims in state court. Whatever the case may 
be, the United States’ federal system recognizes that the state courts 
are “coequal parts of our national judicial system” that “give serious 
attention to their responsibilities for enforcing the commands of the 
Constitution.”4 However, while we can be confident in the competence 
of the state courts to resolve issues of federal law,5 the Supreme Court 
has noted that there are benefits to the resolution of federal issues in 
federal court, as federal courts provide “experience, solicitude, and 
hope of uniformity.”6 Indeed, one does not need to view the state 
courts as inferior to recognize that there are benefits to the federal 
forum.  
Take federal patent law. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 grants the federal courts 
exclusive jurisdiction over federal issues “arising under any Act of 
Congress relating to patents.”7 The highly specialized nature of patent 
law, along with a need for uniformity in its administration, has 
motivated Congress to centralize patent appeals in the Federal Circuit.8 
 
 2. State justiciability doctrines may allow for the resolution of cases in state courts that 
would not make it into federal court due to standing defects. See generally Helen Hershkoff, State 
Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833 (2001) 
(discussing state justiciability doctrines); William A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” 
Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (1990) 
(arguing that state courts should adhere to Article III requirements when adjudicating questions 
of federal law). 
 3. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005) 
(holding that a federal issue raised within a state law claim must be “actually disputed and 
substantial” in order for the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over the issue under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331).  
 4. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 241 (1990). 
 5. See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (“[W]e have consistently held that state 
courts have inherent authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims 
arising under the laws of the United States.”); see also Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, 
Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 214 (1983) (“Our study indicates that state courts are no more 
‘hostile’ to the vindication of federal rights than are their federal counterparts . . . .”). 
 6. Grable, 545 U.S. at 312.  
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 1338. 
 8. See Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit in Perspective, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 823 
(2005) (describing the motivating factors leading to the creation of the Federal Circuit, including 
“[t]he need for national consistency” and the desire for “a national appellate court with 
experience in the complexities of technology”).  
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However, whether it be by unusual circumstances9 or by artful 
pleading,10 patent issues will sometimes be barred from resolution in a 
federal forum. In addition to frustrating Congress’s desire for 
uniformity in the administration of the patent laws, this also presents 
challenges for state courts. Since patent issues arise more frequently in 
federal courts, state judges are less likely to be experienced in patent 
law,11 and state courts have a comparatively smaller interest in their 
resolution.12 In some cases, the question might be easily resolved by 
looking to relevant law and federal court precedent. In other cases, a 
state court might be faced with a genuinely novel issue of federal law.  
One can imagine other scenarios where the state courts are likely 
to have little interest or experience. A case might present a complex 
issue involving the Internal Revenue Code13 or a similarly lengthy 
federal statute. If the U.S. Supreme Court has resolved the issue, the 
state courts are bound to follow.14 When lower federal court precedent 
exists on the matter, the state court might be happy to simply follow 
that.15 But when no federal precedent exists, the state court may have 
 
 9. See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013) (holding that “legal malpractice claims 
based on underlying patent matters will rarely, if ever, arise under federal patent law” even 
though “such cases may necessarily raise disputed questions of patent law”). 
 10. See generally Ted D. Lee & Ann Livingston, The Road Less Traveled: State Court 
Resolution of Patent, Trademark, or Copyright Disputes, 19 ST. MARY’S L.J. 703 (1988) (arguing 
that litigating patent issues in state court may be preferable for clients and describing various ways 
to avoid federal jurisdiction). 
 11. There are some issues in which patent law is incidentally involved that the state courts 
might answer somewhat frequently; the state law of trade secrets is one example. Id. at 713.  
 12. A court might be less interested in building precedent in an area of law that does not 
typically arise within its jurisdiction. 
 13. See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 310–12 
(2005) (describing a state law claim that raised an issue of federal tax law; although the Court held 
that the issue in this case could be heard by a federal court, the issue could have easily been heard 
by the state court as well if, for example, the defendant decided not to remove to federal court). 
 14. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (holding that interpretations of federal law 
enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court have binding effect on the states, including state judicial 
officers). 
 15. See, e.g., Devi v. Senior & Disabled Servs. Div., 905 P.2d 846, 848 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) 
(“We are not bound by decisions of the federal courts of appeals on issues of federal law 
unresolved by the United States Supreme Court. . . . Nevertheless, we give those courts’ decisions 
due regard. On our independent review of the issues presented, we find the [Ninth Circuit’s] 
reasoning . . . persuasive . . . .”); State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enters., Inc., 984 N.E.2d 449, 462 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (“Therefore, to maintain a uniform body of law in interpreting the Act, we 
will follow [a decision of the federal courts of appeals] and apply its holding to our own analysis 
of the Act . . . .”); see also Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower 
Federal Court Precedent on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53, 62–64 (2015) 
(describing the differing approaches of state courts toward using lower federal court precedent). 
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to undertake the labor of resolving the federal issue, while perhaps 
contributing to later nonuniformity if the federal courts come to a 
different conclusion.16 But what if, when presented with complicated 
issues with which they have little interest, the state courts could ask the 
federal courts how they would resolve the issue and then defer to the 
federal court decision? Federal courts are capable of doing something 
similar when they are faced with unresolved questions of state law 
through the practice of certification.17 
For some time, the federal courts have had the power to certify 
questions of state law to state courts.18 In general, the procedure works 
in the following way: when a federal court is asked to resolve a question 
of state law that has not been definitively resolved by the relevant 
state’s courts, most states allow the federal court to send the question 
of state law to the state’s highest court.19 Instead of guessing how the 
state’s highest court would resolve the issue20 or dismissing the case to 
await a state court determination,21 the federal court isolates the 
question of state law and asks the state’s highest court for an answer.22 
Usually, the certified question is phrased as a discrete question of law23 
and is accompanied by a statement of facts relevant to resolving the 
issue.24 The state court then has discretion to decide whether to answer 
 
 16. See Wayne A. Logan, A House Divided: When State and Lower Federal Courts Disagree 
on Federal Constitutional Rights, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 254–62 (2014) (describing the 
consequences of conflicting interpretations of federal constitutional law between the federal 
courts of appeals and the state courts). Although Professor Logan’s analysis focuses on 
constitutional interpretations, some of the consequences would apply in the case of conflicting 
statutory interpretations as well. 
 17. Federal courts are enabled to do so by state legislation. See infra notes 88–92 and 
accompanying text. 
 18. See infra Part I.B. 
 19. Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts To Certify Questions of 
State Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1672, 1674 (2003). North Carolina is the only state that does not 
allow federal courts to certify questions to its courts. JASON A. CANTONE & CARLY E. GRIFFIN, 
CERTIFIED QUESTIONS OF STATE LAW: AN EXAMINATION OF STATE AND TERRITORIAL 
AUTHORIZING STATUTES 1 (2020). 
 20. As would be required by the Erie doctrine. See infra notes 74–80 and accompanying text. 
 21. As would usually be required by Pullman abstention prior to the availability of 
certification. See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 22. See, e.g., Amaker v. King County, 540 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e respectfully 
certify to the Washington Supreme Court the following questions: (1) Whether only those 
individuals identified as ‘next of kin’ as defined by RCW § 68.50.160 at the time of the decedent’s 
death have standing to bring a claim for tortious interference with a corpse?”). 
 23. E.g., id. 
 24. See, e.g., id. at 1013–14 (“Before addressing the questions certified to the Washington 
Supreme Court, we first summarize the material facts and procedural history.”). 
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the question.25 If the state court accepts the question, it will return an 
opinion of law to the federal court,26 sometimes following briefing and 
argument by the parties.27 The federal court can then defer to the state 
court’s answer to resolve the original litigation. 
While this procedure has existed for some time,28 there is no 
analogous tool for state courts to certify questions to their federal 
counterparts.29 At first glance, it is not hard to see why this imbalance 
exists. Federal court certification of state law questions is motivated in 
part by doctrines that require the federal courts to defer to state 
courts,30 whereas, in contrast, state courts are largely expected to 
resolve federal questions on their own.31 Even so, there are many 
contexts in which a state court may wish to defer to federal courts. 
Indeed, many of the benefits that federal courts receive from 
certification could apply equally to the state courts. Certification gives 
courts a discretionary tool for conserving judicial resources, furthers 
institutional comity, and enhances fairness to litigants.32  
Furthermore, if there is value to the resolution of federal issues in 
federal court, as some courts and scholars have argued,33 then there is 
reason to support certification as an additional avenue for federal 
issues arising in state court to reach a federal forum. As some 
 
 25. See, e.g., Abrams v. W. Va. Racing Comm’n, 263 S.E.2d 103, 106–07 (W. Va. 1980) 
(recognizing the benefits of certification but refusing to answer a certified question because 
resolution of state law issues would not be dispositive). 
 26. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 254 P.3d 237, 240–49 (Cal. 2011) (answering a certified 
question from the Ninth Circuit and providing a discussion of the legal issues). 
 27. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 500.27(e) (2021) (“If the certification 
is accepted . . . . The Clerk of the Court shall notify the parties of the time periods for filing of 
printed briefs and briefs in digital format, if any, and calendaring of argument, if any, directed by 
the Court.”). 
 28. See infra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. 
 29. Andrew D. Bradt, Grable on the Ground: Mitigating Unchecked Jurisdictional 
Discretion, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1153, 1209–10 (2011) (“[S]o far, there is no reciprocal ability 
for state courts to certify questions of federal law to a federal court.”). 
 30. See infra notes 74–79 and accompanying text. 
 31. See, e.g., Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 736 (2009) (holding that states may not use 
jurisdictional rules to discriminate against federal rights or causes of action). 
 32. These benefits are addressed at greater length later in this Note. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 33. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005); see 
also Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the Justifications for Federal 
Question Jurisdiction, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 124–32 (2009) (recognizing the expertise of federal 
judges in resolving issues of federal law, but also pointing out the limits of that expertise); Erwin 
Chemerinsky & Larry Kramer, Defining the Role of the Federal Courts, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 67, 
85 (“[F]ederal courts are comparatively more skilled than state courts at interpreting and applying 
federal law . . . .”). 
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commentators note, it is increasingly rare for the Supreme Court to 
review state court decisions involving federal issues.34 Certiorari to 
state courts makes up a small portion of an already miniscule Supreme 
Court docket.35 Practically speaking, state courts are the final word on 
federal law for many litigants. Certification, however, could provide 
the federal courts with additional opportunities to consider and resolve 
issues of federal law, to the benefit of both the litigants and the judicial 
system. 
However, the prospect of enabling state courts to certify questions 
of federal law to the federal courts, or “reverse certification” as some 
scholars call it,36 has received little academic attention.37 From my 
review, only two scholars have given the proposal serious attention, 
and even then, only as short proposals designed to remedy a narrow 
problem.38 This Note endeavors to give reverse certification focused 
consideration. Furthermore, this Note will focus especially on the 
benefits of reverse certification to judicial administration, and not just 
the benefits to litigants who aspire to access a federal forum. 
Ultimately, this Note will conclude that enabling the state courts to 
 
 34. Jeffrey S. Sutton & Brittany Jones, The Certiorari Process and State Court Decisions, 131 
HARV. L. REV. 167, 169–72 (2018) (collecting data demonstrating the rarity of Supreme Court 
review of state court decisions and noting that “[t]he data in more recent Terms suggests a greater 
disparity”). 
 35. See id. at 167 (noting the small percentage of petitions for certiorari that reach the 
Court’s merits docket). 
 36. It appears that the term “reverse certification” may have first been used by Judge Bruce 
M. Selya. Bruce M. Selya, Certified Madness: Ask a Silly Question . . ., 29 SUFFOLK L. REV. 677, 
685 (1996). The term has caught on in subsequent scholarship. See Bradt, supra note 29, at 1160 
(“[F]ederal courts should adopt a procedure allowing state courts to certify federal questions in 
their cases to the federal circuit courts—a form of ‘reverse certification.’”). 
 37. Most scholarship considering reverse certification has given the idea only very brief 
attention. See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent Law Federalism, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 11, 73 n.367 
(considering, in a footnote, whether allowing state courts to certify questions to the Federal 
Circuit could help break the “cycle of removal” in patent litigation); Mitchell N. Berman, R. 
Anthony Reese & Ernest A. Young, State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property 
Rights: How To “Fix” Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1114 n.378 
(2001) (considering, in a footnote, the proposal that state courts could certify questions of 
intellectual property law); Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable 
Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1293, 1298–99 (2003) (proposing that Congress should shift more 
criminal cases to state courts, and that state courts should be able to certify complicated questions 
of federal law that arise); Selya, supra note 36 (entertaining and criticizing “reverse certification” 
as a proposal). 
 38. See Bradt, supra note 29, at 1207–19 (considering reverse certification as a potential 
solution to the tendency of federal district courts to reject jurisdiction over federal issues arising 
in state law claims under the Grable test); Logan, supra note 16, at 271–78 (arguing that Congress 
should enable state courts to certify questions to the U.S. Supreme Court when a split of authority 
occurs between state courts and lower federal courts). 
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certify questions of federal law would be both practically and 
symbolically desirable. Doing so would provide benefits to both state 
and federal forums, and it would strengthen institutional comity and 
reciprocity between both courts. This latter benefit will result even if 
certification is used sparingly by the state courts. Given these benefits, 
this Note advocates for some give and take in modern certification 
practice. 
The Note proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the 
history of certification in the federal courts and explains how 
certification of questions of state law has become a mainstream 
practice. Part II then focuses on reverse certification from a policy 
perspective and considers practical elements: what the benefits of 
reverse certification might be, how it might work, and when it might be 
utilized. Part III then considers the constitutionality of reverse 
certification and concludes that a reverse certification procedure could 
be consistent with Article III restrictions on federal judicial power.  
I.  CERTIFICATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
Although infrequently discussed, certification comes in many 
forms. Federal courts can certify to state courts; state courts can certify 
to other state courts;39 and intermediate appellate courts can certify to 
courts of last resort.40 Generally, any discussion of federal certification 
procedure likely refers to the certification of questions of state law to 
state courts. However, this is not the exclusive avenue for federal 
certification. Indeed, the federal courts of appeals have been capable 
of certifying questions directly to the U.S. Supreme Court for 
centuries.41 This Part will discuss the two federal certification 
procedures that currently exist. Section A will begin by discussing 
certification from the federal courts of appeals to the Supreme Court, 
which is the older of the two. Section B will then discuss certification 
from federal courts to the state courts, which has become far more 
common. 
 
 39. See generally Ira P. Robbins, Interstate Certification of Questions of Law: A Valuable 
Process in Need of Reform, 76 JUDICATURE 125 (1992) (describing interstate certification and 
advocating for expanding its use). 
 40. For example, the federal circuit courts of appeals can certify questions to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2). Some states also have procedures that allow state 
intermediate appellate courts to certify questions to the state’s highest court. See, e.g., FLA. R. 
APP. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v) (allowing Florida’s intermediate appellate courts to certify questions 
“of great public importance” to the Florida Supreme Court). 
 41. See infra Part I.A. 
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A. Certification to the U.S. Supreme Court 
Although certification to the Supreme Court has fallen out of 
practice, there are good reasons to discuss this old variety of 
certification before considering a system of reverse certification. The 
practice demonstrates that certification exists as a tried-and-true 
method for resolving federal issues in federal courts, albeit one that has 
been neglected for some time. 
Certification to the Supreme Court predates the federal courts as 
we know them today. In 1802, when the first statute enabling 
certification to the Supreme Court was passed,42 each of the six circuit 
courts consisted of only two judges: a Justice of the Supreme Court 
riding circuit, and “the district judge of the district, where such court 
shall be holden.”43 The first certification statute allowed parties to 
request certification when “the opinions of the judges shall be 
opposed.”44 Thus, it appears that certification was originally a response 
to intracircuit splits between two-judge panels. In those days, 
certification was sometimes the only method for a case to reach the 
Supreme Court for review.45 
In 1891, the passing of the Evarts Act46 introduced the modern 
courts of appeals.47 Even though the Act provided for the writ of 
certiorari as a new way to bring cases before the Supreme Court,48 the 
 
 42. See Kevin G. Crennan, The Viability of Certification in Federal Appellate Procedure, 52 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 2025, 2028 (2011) (“Certification has deep historical roots that extend as 
far back as 1802.”). 
 43. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, § 4, 2 Stat. 156, 157–58. 
 44. Id. at 159. 
 45. See Aaron Nielson, The Death of the Supreme Court’s Certified Question Jurisdiction, 59 
CATH. U. L. REV. 483, 486 (2010) (“For a long time, certification was the exclusive statutory 
method by which many cases could reach the Supreme Court.”). 
 46. Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 826. The Act is commonly known as the 
“Evarts Act” in reference to its primary sponsor: Senator William M. Evarts. See Paul D. 
Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A Late Century View, 1987 S.C. L. REV. 411, 414–
16 (describing Evarts’s sponsorship of the bill and the compromises made to secure its passing). 
 47. See generally ch. 517, 26 Stat. at 826 (establishing the “circuit courts of appeals” as 
intermediate appellate courts).  
 48. Id. at 828 (“[I]n any such case as is hereinbefore made final in the circuit court of appeals 
it shall be competent for the Supreme Court to require, by certiorari or otherwise, any such case 
to be certified to the Supreme Court for its review . . . .”); Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning 
Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 
1650–51 (2000) (noting the introduction of the writ of certiorari in the 1891 Act). 
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Act also explicitly retained the practice of certification.49 The Judiciary 
Act of 1925 (“1925 Act”) again retained certification,50 and the 
statutory basis for certification has remained substantially the same 
ever since.51 The current statutory language providing for certification, 
in 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2), provides:  
Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court 
by the following methods: . . . (2) By certification at any time by a 
court of appeals of any question of law in any civil or criminal case as 
to which instructions are desired, and upon such certification the 
Supreme Court may give binding instructions or require the entire 
record to be sent up for decision of the entire matter in controversy.52 
In the decade following the 1925 Act, certification was used with some 
regularity. Between 1927 and 1936, “courts of appeals issued seventy-
two certificates.”53 However, certification declined after 1930, with 
only sixteen certificates having been issued since then.54 The Supreme 
Court has accepted only four certificates since 1946, with the most 
recent being in 1985.55  
What happened? If there is a suspect in certification’s death, it 
would be the Supreme Court itself.56 The Court made clear in several 
cases that certification could be used only in very limited 
circumstances.57 This led to a general reluctance to certify among 
 
 49. § 6, 26 Stat. at 828 (“[T]he circuit court of appeals at any time may certify to the Supreme 
Court of the United States any questions or propositions of law concerning which it desires the 
instruction of that court for its proper decision.”). 
 50. As the Judiciary Act of 1925 provides, 
In any case, civil or criminal, in a circuit court of appeals, or in the Court of Appeals of 
the District of Columbia, the court at any time may certify to the Supreme Court of the 
United States any questions or propositions of law concerning which instructions are 
desired for the proper decision of the cause. 
Judiciary Act of 1925 (Judges’ Bill), ch. 229, § 239, 43 Stat. 936, 938. 
 51. See Nielson, supra note 45, at 485–86 (noting that the current version of the certification 
statute “has been part of the United States Code since 1948, and a ‘substantially’ identical version 
has existed since 1925”). 
 52. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(2). 
 53. Nielson, supra note 45 (quoting Hartnett, supra note 48, at 1710). 
 54. Id.  
 55. Hartnett, supra note 48, at 1712 & n.404. 
 56. See Nielson, supra note 45, at 488 (“The question, then, is not whether certification is 
dead, but why it is dead. Or, rather, who killed it? The Supreme Court did . . . .”). 
 57. See Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957) (holding that an intracircuit 
split was not an “occasion for invoking so exceptional a jurisdiction of this Court as that on 
certification”); Crennan, supra note 42, at 2040–41 (collecting cases in which the Supreme Court 
has restricted the use of certification).  
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federal appellate judges.58 One motivating factor in the Court’s 
decision to restrict certification was likely the fact that certification 
historically entailed mandatory review.59 Although incapable of 
dismissing certified questions for discretionary reasons, the Court 
could nonetheless control its docket by arguing that certification in a 
given case was legally improper.60 Certification’s death was all but 
confirmed when the Supreme Court refused to answer a question 
certified by the Fifth Circuit in 2009, with only Justices John Paul 
Stevens and Antonin Scalia dissenting from the refusal to answer.61 
Some scholars, notably Professors Amanda Tyler and Aaron 
Nielson, lament the Supreme Court’s reluctance to answer certified 
questions and argue for a resurgence of the practice.62 However, 
regardless of whether certification to the Supreme Court returns, the 
history of the practice provides a background for certified questions in 
the federal courts. The procedure indicates that it would not shake the 
foundations of the federal judiciary to suggest that a federal court could 
answer a federal question certified to it in the context of an ongoing 
litigation. If anything, the decline of certification to the Supreme Court 
can be attributed not to any constitutional defect of certification, but 
rather to the Supreme Court’s desire to control its docket.63 Of course, 
 
 58. See Nielson, supra note 45, at 489–91 (describing the reluctance of circuit courts of 
appeals to certify questions to the Supreme Court); Taylor v. Atl. Mar. Co., 181 F.2d 84, 85 n.2 
(2d Cir. 1950) (“We will not certify the question to the Supreme Court. . . . It is not for us to decide 
what matters are of enough importance to require decision by that court; the control of its docket 
should rest exclusively in its own hands.”). 
 59. See Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October 
Term, 1929, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1, 35 (1930) (“Petitions for certiorari the Court can deny, but 
questions certified must be answered.”). 
 60. As the Wisniewski court noted, 
It is also the task of a Court of Appeals to decide all properly presented cases coming 
before it, except in the rare instances, as for example the pendency of another case 
before this Court raising the same issue, when certification may be advisable in the 
proper administration and expedition of judicial business. 
353 U.S. at 902. 
 61. United States v. Seale, 558 U.S. 985, 985 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 62. See generally Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court’s Agenda: Is There a Place for 
Certification?, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1310 (2010) (arguing for a limited revival of certification); 
see Nielson, supra note 45, at 490–92 (“[m]ourning” the death of certification); Tracey E. George 
& Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 
DUKE. L.J. 1439, 1450–51 (2009) (arguing that “certification today could be even more valuable 
than it was a hundred years ago”). 
 63. Members of the Court have at times been forthright about their desire to reduce 
caseloads on the Court. Cf. Warren Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 ABA 
J. 442, 442 (1983) (“Today I will focus on only one subject, which is perhaps the most important 
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there are constitutional considerations involved when a federal court 
answers a certified question, and some of those concerns have been 
present when the Supreme Court has considered its own power to 
answer certified questions.64 But such concerns do not preclude 
certification altogether.65  
While certification to the Supreme Court may be dead, one form 
of certification is very much alive in the federal courts—certification of 
questions of state law to state courts. The next Section will focus on 
this form of certification.  
B. Certification of State Law Questions to the State Courts 
In 1945, the Florida legislature passed a statute allowing the 
Florida Supreme Court to receive and answer certified questions from 
certain federal courts.66 This act of “rare foresight”67 went completely 
unnoticed until 1960, when the U.S. Supreme Court decided to certify 
a question of Florida law to the Florida Supreme Court.68 This was a 
watershed moment for federal/state certification; in the decade 
following, several states adopted certification statutes of their own, and 
the Uniform Law Commission recommended a uniform certification 
statute.69  
By many accounts, the adoption of certification statutes was 
driven by two problems: the onerous litigation costs imposed on 
litigants by federal abstention doctrines and the challenges of 
ascertaining state law following the Erie doctrine.70 Federal abstention 
 
single, immediate problem facing the judiciary, and that is the caseload of the Supreme 
Court . . . .”).  
 64. The Court’s primary concern has been that a certified answer could be a prohibited 
exercise of the Court’s original jurisdiction. See White v. Turk, 37 U.S. 238, 239 (1838) (“This 
certificate, therefore, brings the whole cause before this Court; and, if we were to decide the 
questions presented, it would, in effect, be the exercise of original, rather than appellate 
jurisdiction.”); Crennan, supra note 42, at 2033–39 (discussing constitutional issues involved in 
certification to the Supreme Court). This issue will not be discussed further in this Note. 
 65. See infra Part III. 
 66. Brian Mattis, Certification of Questions of State Law: An Impractical Tool in the Hands 
of the Federal Courts, 23 U. MIA. L. REV. 717, 717 (1969).  
 67. Clay v. Sun Ins. Off. Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960). 
 68. See id. (deciding to utilize Florida’s certification statute). 
 69. Mattis, supra note 66, at 721.  
 70. See id. at 718 (discussing certification in relationship to abstention doctrine); Gregory L. 
Acquaviva, The Certification of Unsettled Questions of State Law to State High Courts: The Third 
Circuit’s Experience, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 377, 381 (2010) (describing certification of state law 
questions as “precipitated by the Erie doctrine”); M. Bryan Schneider, “But Answer Came There 
None”: The Michigan Supreme Court and the Certified Question of State Law, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 
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doctrines, such as Pullman abstention,71 require federal courts, when 
certain circumstances are present, to halt or dismiss federal litigation 
so that a controversy may be resolved in a state court.72 Certification 
provides an alternative that is more efficient on its face: instead of 
forcing a litigant to start over in state court, the federal court can certify 
the question of state law directly to the state’s highest court. Once the 
state court returns a definitive answer, the federal court can resolve the 
remaining federal issues if necessary.  
While abstention imposes burdens on aspiring federal litigants, 
the Court’s decision in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins73 imposes 
burdens on the federal courts. Erie, of course, requires federal courts 
to follow the decisions of state courts when resolving questions of state 
law.74 In some cases, applicable state decisional law is unclear or 
conflicting, and the federal court is called upon to resolve an open 
question of state law.75 In such a scenario, federal courts generally 
approach the problem by predicting how the state’s highest court 
would resolve the issue, a so-called “Erie guess.”76 As one federal judge 
put it, this process is “laborious, often onerously so.”77 In unclear cases, 
the Erie inquiry can require a judge to “exhaustively analyze[] all the 
 
273, 277 (1995) (describing “the difficulties faced by federal courts in ascertaining state law and 
the Erie and abstention doctrines” as “the background which gave rise to the use of the certified 
question”).  
 71. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).  
 72. See id. at 501 (holding that a federal district court ought to “sta[y] its hands” if the 
resolution of a state law issue by a state court “cannot be pursued with full protection of the 
constitutional claim”). 
 73. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 74. Id. at 79 (“[T]he authority and only authority is the State, and if that be so, the voice 
adopted by the State as its own [whether it be of its Legislature or of its Supreme Court] should 
utter the last word.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer 
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 535 (1928))).  
 75. See Geri J. Yonover, Ascertaining State Law: The Continuing Erie Dilemma, 38 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1988) (describing the circumstances in which a federal court must resolve a 
question of state law on its own). 
 76. Haley N. Schaffer & David F. Herr, Why Guess? Erie Guesses and the Eighth Circuit, 36 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1625, 1626 (2010) (describing the Eighth Circuit’s approach to the “Erie 
guess”); Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 365 U.S. 293, 295–96 (1961) (instructing the lower federal 
court to determine the relative weights that the New York Court of Appeals would accord to 
authoritative sources when answering a California state law question); Phansalkar v. Andersen 
Weinroth & Co., L.P., 344 F.3d 184, 199 (2d. Cir. 2003) (“Where the substantive law of the forum 
state is uncertain or ambiguous, the job of the federal courts is carefully to predict how the highest 
court of the forum state would resolve the uncertainty or ambiguity.” (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. 
v. 633 Third Assocs., 14 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994))). 
 77. J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE 
L. REV. 317, 321 (1967). 
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state court cases even remotely in point,”78 and perhaps even seek out 
law review articles, treatises, and decisions from other states “which 
might impress and influence the state high court in deciding the issue 
today.”79 
While the “predictive” approach to the Erie inquiry has received 
some pushback,80 Erie can put federal judges to a time-consuming task. 
Certification provides an alternative. Instead of predicting what a state 
court will do, the federal court can simply ask the state court. But 
certification does more than save federal courts’ time;81 it gives state 
courts an opportunity to resolve unclear state law issues that arise in 
federal court. Without certification, federal courts may sometimes 
serve as the final word on open questions of state law, at least so far as 
the litigants are concerned.82 Since there is no avenue to appeal state 
law issues from federal court to a state high court, certification provides 
a state with additional autonomy over how its law is applied.  
There are other benefits to certification that merit mentioning. 
Certification provides state courts with more opportunities to develop 
state law, as it could present factual scenarios that the state courts 
would have otherwise not seen.83 It allows for unresolved legal issues 
to be answered by the same body whether they arise in federal or state 
court, which enhances uniformity and could reduce forum shopping.84 
According to several federal and state judges, certification also 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 710–15 
(1995) (discussing some of the jurisprudential issues involved in the predictive model and 
suggesting an alternative); Yonover, supra note 75, at 8 (describing one federal judge’s relatively 
idiosyncratic approach to the Erie inquiry).  
 81. The time saved here refers to the time the federal courts would have otherwise spent 
conducting the laborious Erie inquiry. Certification is time-consuming in another sense since it 
prolongs litigation while the federal courts wait for a state court’s answer. See Lehman Bros. v. 
Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 394 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“[Certification] entails more delay 
and expense than would an ordinary decision of the state question on the merits by the federal 
court.”); Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 919 F.3d 992, 994 (6th Cir. 2019) (Clay, J., 
concurring) (stating that resort to certification in diversity cases “serve[s] little purpose other than 
to needlessly delay resolution of the ultimate issues in the case”). 
 82. While federal court decisions on open questions of state law are not binding authority in 
future cases, the judgments will nonetheless bind the parties involved.  
 83. See Nash, supra note 19, at 1697 (asserting that certification “gives the state judiciary the 
opportunity to rule on important issues of state law in cases in which it might not otherwise have 
had the chance”). 
 84. Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial 
Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1544 (1997). 
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promotes institutional comity between the courts.85 Lastly, there may 
be an enhanced sense of fairness among litigants when a state law 
question is resolved by the court positioned to deliver a definitive 
answer with binding effect on future litigation.86 
Driven by Pullman, Erie, and federalism concerns, certification of 
state law questions has become a relatively common practice in the 
federal courts. As of this writing, forty-nine states, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Mariana 
Islands all have certified question statutes.87 North Carolina is the only 
state without such a statute.88 Although there is some variation, each 
statute authorizes certification from at least one federal court of 
appeals,89 and all but one authorize certified questions from the U.S. 
Supreme Court.90 Some states accept certified questions from the 
federal district courts or the U.S. bankruptcy courts as well.91  
With certification now widely available, data shows that the 
federal courts use the tool quite frequently. A recent study examined 
certification practices in the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits from 2010 
to 2018.92 In that span, the Ninth Circuit certified the most questions, 
eighty-nine total, of which 80 percent were accepted by the state high 
 
 85. See John B. Corr & Ira P. Robbins, Interjurisdictional Certification and Choice of Law, 
41 VAND. L. REV. 411, 457 (1988) (recounting the position of several federal and state judges that 
“the federal courts’ use of certification improves federal-state comity”). The comity that might 
result from certification is discussed later in this Note. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing, in the 
fourth paragraph, how certification might advance institutional comity between courts). 
 86. See Nash, supra note 19, at 1698 (“[C]ertification offers a federalism benefit to litigants 
in the form of ‘fairness.’ Specifically, it provides federal court litigants the benefit of a resolution 
of their case based upon definitive state law.”); see Selya, supra note 36, at 690 (claiming that 
fairness concerns are the “best argument in favor of certification,” but noting that “litigants do 
not have an entitlement to something identifiable in the abstract as a ‘right’ answer”). 
 87. CANTONE & GRIFFIN, supra note 19. 
 88. Id. The North Carolina legislature has considered allowing certification, but legislation 
has yet to be passed despite support from judges on the Fourth Circuit and a few justices on the 
North Carolina Supreme Court. See Matthew Nis Leerberg, Bill Would Allow Federal Courts To 
Certify Questions to the North Carolina Supreme Court, FOX ROTHSCHILD (Feb. 23, 2017), https:/
/ncapb.foxrothschild.com/2017/02/23/bill-would-allow-federal-courts-to-certify-questions-to-the-
north-carolina-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/WE6J-9JBV] (discussing a proposed bill that 
would enable the North Carolina Supreme Court to answer certified questions). 
 89. CANTONE & GRIFFIN, supra note 19, at 3. 
 90. Id. at 2. The exception is the New Jersey statute, which allows certified questions only 
from the Third Circuit. N.J. CT. R. 2:12A-1. 
 91. CANTONE & GRIFFIN, supra note 19, at 3–4. 
 92. JASON A. CANTONE & CARLY GRIFFIN, CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF STATE LAW 
IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD, SIXTH, AND NINTH CIRCUITS (2010–2018) 1 
(2020) [hereinafter CERTIFICATION IN THE THIRD, SIXTH, AND NINTH CIRCUITS].  
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court (in most instances, the Supreme Court of California).93 The Sixth 
Circuit saw much less certification activity; between 2010 and 2018, the 
Sixth Circuit certified only ten questions to state courts, of which only 
six were accepted.94 The Third Circuit certified thirty-one questions in 
the years surveyed, and experienced a higher rate of response from the 
state courts, with 87 percent acceptance.95 These numbers indicate a 
wide variation in certification practices among the courts of appeals. 
They also indicate that certification has become relatively 
commonplace in some circuits.  
The Second Circuit also has a reputation for frequent certification. 
Between 2012 and 2017, the Second Circuit certified thirty-nine 
questions to state courts, thirty-one of which were directed at the New 
York Court of Appeals.96 This is perhaps in part due to the support of 
Second Circuit Judge Guido Calabresi, who once implored the federal 
courts to “certify, certify, certify”97 whenever a question of state law is 
“even possibly in doubt.”98 The Second Circuit certified at least seven 
questions to the New York Court of Appeals alone in 2020, indicating 
that certification trends in the Circuit continue at a steady pace.99 
The courts of appeals also vary in the criteria they use to 
determine whether to certify a question of state law. Although the 
Supreme Court has endorsed certification,100 it has given little guidance 
on what factors lower courts should consider when deciding whether 
to certify. In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,101 for example, 
the Court held that a “[n]ovel, unsettled question[] of state law” was 
“necessary before federal courts may avail themselves of state 
certification procedures.”102 But the Court has also made clear that 
 
 93. Id. at 5–9. 
 94. Id. at 9. 
 95. Id. at 7. 
 96. Scott A. Chesin & Karen W. Lin, Certification from the Second Circuit to the N.Y. Court 
of Appeals: A Guide, N.Y. L.J. (Apr. 10, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/almID/1202783229410/Certification-From-the-Second-Circuit-to-the-NY-
Court-of-Appeals-A-Guide [https://perma.cc/EVS9-SECD]. 
 97. Calabresi, supra note 37, at 1301.  
 98. Id. 
 99. Certified Questions (500.27), NYCOURTS.GOV, https://web.archive.org/web/
20210320231127/https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/certquest.htm [https://perma.cc/GAR8-FPFY].  
 100. See, e.g., Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (“[Certification] does, of 
course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial 
federalism.”). 
 101. Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997). 
 102. Id. at 79. 
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resort to certification is not obligatory in such circumstances.103 The 
Court has said little else about what factors inform a discretionary 
decision to certify. In Arizonans, the Court found that the requests for 
certification in that case “merited more respectful consideration than 
they received” by the courts below “[g]iven the novelty of the question 
and its potential importance to the conduct of Arizona’s business.”104  
Endowed with wide discretion by the Supreme Court, the circuits 
developed their own criteria for deciding whether to certify. The Ninth 
Circuit, for example, held that “[t]he certification procedure is reserved 
for state law questions that present significant issues, including those 
with important public policy ramifications, and that have not yet been 
resolved by the state courts.”105 The Ninth Circuit also noted that 
certification should not be used because a legal issue is “difficult,” but 
rather because of “deference” to the state court.106 Other circuits have 
had more difficulty developing a test. In the Sixth Circuit, for example, 
a recent decision not to certify triggered three different opinions 
discussing when the Circuit should take advantage of certification.107 
The competing opinions highlighted the tension between two values at 
stake in the decision whether to certify: the desire for uniform 
application of state law on one hand, and the obligation of federal 
courts to resolve state law issues in diversity jurisdiction on the other.108 
Without consensus, there is some uncertainty regarding what factors 
inform a decision to certify in that circuit. 
As these cases demonstrate, certification depends on judicial self-
regulation. State certification statutes may include some constraints, 
 
 103. Schein, 416 U.S. at 390–91 (“We do not suggest that where there is doubt as to local law 
and where the certification procedure is available, resort to it is obligatory.”). 
 104. Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 78. 
 105. Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003); see Childress v. Costco Wholesale 
Corp., 978 F.3d 664, 666 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying the Kremen v. Cohen factors to determine 
whether to certify).  
 106. Kremen, 325 F.3d at 1037. 
 107. See generally Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 919 F.3d 992 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(denying rehearing en banc of a decision not to certify).  
 108. See id. at 993–94 (Clay, J., concurring) (“[W]hen diversity jurisdiction is properly 
invoked, federal courts have a ‘duty . . . to decide questions of state law whenever necessary to 
the rendition of a judgment.’” (omission in original) (quoting Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 
320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943))); id. at 996 (Bush, J., dissenting) (“[A] federal judge’s assessment of 
state law ‘cannot escape being a forecast rather than a determination’ if the state courts have not 
yet definitively resolved an issue.” (quoting R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 
499 (1941))). 
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such as restricting which courts can certify109 or mandating that the 
state law questions be potentially determinative in the federal case,110 
but certifying courts have wide latitude within those boundaries.  
And it is not just federal courts that are controlling the flow of 
certified questions. State courts can also guide the process when 
deciding whether to accept a certified question.111 In fact, both courts 
have strong incentives to ensure that the process runs smoothly. 
Federal courts want to avoid wasting time by certifying questions that 
will not be answered, and state courts want to avoid wasting time 
poring over certified questions that they will ultimately reject. There is 
reason to expect, then, that certification would become a more efficient 
process over time, as federal and state courts communicate the desired 
balance. Indeed, some of the data above suggests that the process has 
already become quite efficient in some circuits.112  
The above discussion makes clear that certification has become a 
normal practice in at least some federal courts. This leads to the 
primary question this Note considers: Why don’t the federal courts 
accept certified questions themselves? As noted previously, there is no 
shortage of federal questions that struggle to find their way into federal 
court.113 To be sure, certification in general is subject to a fair amount 
of criticism,114 but if certification is here to stay, there are reasons to 
consider making certification a two-way street. The next Part will 
consider what so-called reverse certification might look like and what 
its possible benefits might be.  
 
 109. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 2:12A-1 (“The Supreme Court may answer a question of law certified 
to it by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit . . . .”). 
 110. See, e.g., ALASKA R. APP. P. 407 (allowing certification of state law questions “which 
may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court”). 
 111. State courts sometimes make their reasons known when rejecting a federal court’s 
certified question, but not always. See, e.g., Abrams v. W. Va. Racing Comm’n, 263 S.E.2d 103, 
106–07 (W. Va. 1980) (recognizing the benefits of certification but refusing to answer a certified 
question because resolution of state law issues would not be dispositive); see also Schneider, supra 
note 70, at 315 (“The Michigan Supreme Court, to say the least, is not very receptive to the 
certified question. Not only does the court refuse to answer most questions, but it generally fails 
to state the reasons for its refusal.”). 
 112. Between 2010 and 2018, 87 percent of the Third Circuit’s questions were accepted by the 
relevant state court. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (referencing this statistic). 
 113. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text (introducing this struggle). 
 114. See generally Justin R. Long, Against Certification, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114 (2009) 
(arguing that certification furthers an erroneous view that “state and federal law ought to be 
isolated into separate spheres of jurisprudence”); Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case for 
Transjurisdictional Adjudication, 94 VA. L. REV. 1869, 1885–90 (2008) (arguing that there are 
downsides to allowing cases to be “decompose[d]” for the purpose of certification).  
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II.  CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF FEDERAL LAW 
Given that federal and state judges have praised certification in 
the past,115 it seems odd that there has never been much interest in 
reversing the procedure. Perhaps it is because the primary motivators 
for certification to state courts, namely abstention doctrine and the 
Erie inquiry, do not move in the opposite direction. However, as will 
be shown more extensively below,116 many of the benefits of 
certification procedure could flow in both directions. For example, 
reverse certification would allow the state courts to conserve judicial 
resources by allocating unanswered federal questions to federal courts, 
just as the federal courts conserve resources by certifying to their state 
counterparts. And reverse certification would provide many of the 
same benefits to litigants and the legal system—it would increase 
uniformity in results and reduce the likelihood of splits between state 
high courts and federal courts of appeals. 
In addition to its practical benefits, reverse certification would 
increase institutional comity between the courts. Certification in its 
current form is motivated in part by a desire to conserve resources in 
the federal courts. But many state courts are likewise burdened by 
heavy dockets.117 A reverse certification procedure would represent a 
reciprocal desire by both state and federal courts to share caseloads 
and allocate lawmaking duties efficiently. Furthermore, reverse 
certification has few apparent downsides. As a completely 
discretionary procedure, it does not threaten to add a higher workload 
than the federal courts can bear.118 In short, many of certification’s 
 
 115. See Clark, supra note 84, at 1545–46 (“[T]he Supreme Court of the United States . . . 
prais[ed] the Florida legislature’s ‘rare foresight’ in authorizing certification, and suggest[ed] that 
the court of appeals on remand attempt to obtain an authoritative determination of ‘two 
unresolved state law questions’ by certifying them to the Florida Supreme Court.”); Chesin & 
Lin, supra note 96 (“Frequent use of the certification process has been the norm in the Second 
Circuit since the mid-1990s, when Judge Calabresi joined the court and became a vocal and 
persuasive advocate for use of the procedure.”). 
 116. The practical and symbolic benefits of certification are discussed at greater length later 
in this Note. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 117. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HIGH-
VOLUME DOCKETS 2 (2016) (noting that high volume dockets in state courts present “enormous 
challenges to litigants, judges and court administrators” that “threaten the integrity of judicial 
processes and can thwart meaningful examination of basic facts and claims”). 
 118. A later section of this Note discusses when state courts might certify questions and argues 
that the discretionary use of certification is unlikely to overburden the federal courts. See infra 
Part II.B.3. 
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benefits could work both ways, and without significantly disrupting the 
status quo. 
It may seem surprising, then, that few scholars have considered the 
proposal. Out of the few scholarly discussions on the topic, most 
address the idea only in a footnote or during a brief aside.119 However, 
at least two scholars have given more serious thought to the idea.120 
And others have proposed reforms with similar goals. Judge Jon 
Newman, for example, proposed that federal issues arising in state 
court could be appealed from a state’s highest court to the federal 
courts of appeals.121  
When considering certification of federal questions by state 
courts, several questions immediately arise: Would the benefits 
outweigh the costs? How would it work? When, and how often, would it 
be used? This Part aims to answer these questions and more.122 Two 
approaches to reverse certification are considered: certification by 
state courts directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, and certification to the 
courts of appeals in which the state court sits. Between these two 
approaches, the second is arguably more viable, and will receive more 
attention.  
A. Certification by State Courts to the U.S. Supreme Court 
In some respects, the U.S. Supreme Court is a logical candidate 
for receiving certified questions from the state courts. The Supreme 
Court is the only court that can provide a definitive ruling on federal 
law, just as the state supreme courts provide definitive rulings on state 
law.123 Furthermore, the state courts, with few exceptions, view the 
Supreme Court as the only federal court that can bind them on federal 
issues.124 However, the proposal would need to proceed with cautious 
 
 119. See supra note 37 (describing the scholarship). 
 120. See supra note 38 (referencing the two scholars who have explored the proposal in 
greater depth). 
 121. See Jon O. Newman, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: Proposals To Preserve the 
Federal Judicial System, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 774–76 (1989) (describing a system of “reciprocal 
routing of appeals” between federal and state courts).  
 122. The question whether such proposals would be constitutional, however, is dealt with in 
Part III.  
 123. See Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482, 488 (1976) 
(“We are, of course, bound to accept the interpretation of [state] law by the highest court of the 
State.”). 
 124. See Frost, supra note 15, at 63 (“[A]t least a few state supreme courts appear to consider 
themselves bound by lower federal court decisions on questions of federal law, although that 
number has shrunk in recent years.”). 
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awareness of the Supreme Court’s limited docket. Ideally, any 
plausible proposal for allowing certification from state courts to the 
Supreme Court would need to be either extremely limited,125 
discretionary, or both. But allowing for discretionary certification 
alongside certiorari might seem pointless. Indeed, certified questions 
might be treated in the same manner as petitions for certiorari, with 
similarly low prospects for review. However, there are some reasons to 
believe that adding certification as an additional avenue for Supreme 
Court review of state court decisions would be valuable. 
First, a certified question may be more obviously capable of 
review. The Supreme Court cannot review state court decisions that 
rest on an adequate and independent state law ground.126 In other 
words, a federal issue must be at least partially determinative of the 
state court case for the Supreme Court to assume jurisdiction on 
review. Under Michigan v. Long,127 a state court decision discussing 
federal law is generally considered to be motivated by federal law in 
the absence of a clear expression by the state court to the contrary.128 
While Michigan v. Long simplifies the inquiry, certification may 
simplify it even further. A certified question would amount to a clear 
message from the state supreme court that it believes that state law is 
not adequate to resolve the dispute.129 If it were, certification would not 
be necessary. Of course, a state court could be wrong about the 
necessity of federal law, but certification could streamline the inquiry 
by isolating the federal question to be considered.  
Second, a certified question reflects deference to Supreme Court 
authority. Some scholars suggest that the Supreme Court may see 
review of state court decisions as a more solemn affair than when the 
Court reviews decisions from the courts of appeals.130 Unlike the 
 
 125. For an example of such an extremely limited proposal, see Logan, supra note 16, at 273 
(proposing that state courts should be able to certify questions to the U.S. Supreme Court but 
only in the limited circumstance of “intrastate, state-federal circuit court conflicts”). 
 126. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) (“[W]here the judgment of a state 
court rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other non-federal in character, our 
jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to 
support the judgment.”). 
 127. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).  
 128. Id. at 1040–41. 
 129. This assumes that a federal certification statute would only allow federal questions to be 
certified if they were necessary and dispositive of the case. Many state statutes include such a 
requirement. See infra note 155 (citing to state statutes referencing certification requirements). 
 130. See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS 199–200 (2018) (noting that one 
possible explanation for the infrequency of Supreme Court review of state court decisions could 
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federal appellate courts, state courts are not participants in the same 
judicial system as the Supreme Court, and certiorari review of the state 
courts can seem more intrusive. The Supreme Court may be more 
hesitant to review the decisions of a state’s highest court in an attempt 
to “dignify the independent sovereign status of the state courts.”131 
Certification, in contrast to certiorari, would reflect explicit consent by 
the state court for Supreme Court review. Thus, the Supreme Court 
may be more comfortable answering certified questions. 
While these benefits may be small, the downsides to allowing state 
courts to certify questions to the Supreme Court would likewise be 
small. Certified questions would be unlikely to significantly affect the 
number of cases brought before the Court, as state judges would likely 
be aware of the gravitas involved in certifying a question to the 
Supreme Court. But that awareness might also dissuade state judges 
from certifying altogether, especially if there were an alternative 
option to certify to the courts of appeals, which will be discussed below. 
It is worth noting, though, that the process would be somewhat 
reciprocal. The Supreme Court has itself certified questions to the state 
supreme courts on several occasions.132 But, for better or worse, the 
Supreme Court’s nature makes it perhaps less likely to answer certified 
questions in return. The next Section considers a much more likely 
candidate for certification. 
B. Certification by State Courts to the Federal Courts of Appeals 
Allowing state courts to certify federal questions to the courts of 
appeals is a far more intuitive proposal. The federal appellate courts 
oversee extensive dockets and are designed to resolve legal issues that 
have a prior procedural history.133 Furthermore, as discussed 
previously, the courts of appeals frequently take advantage of state 
certification statutes, and thus, there would be a degree of reciprocity 
in asking them to answer certified questions in return. It is not 
surprising, then, that the sparse academic commentary considering 
 
be that “the National Court has come to see infrequent review of state court decisions as a way 
to convey respect for the state courts,” but ultimately arguing that infrequent review does not 
necessarily convey respect). 
 131. Id. at 199. 
 132. See Tyler, supra note 62, at 1325 n.88 (collecting six cases in which the United States 
Supreme Court certified a question of state law to the highest court of a state). 
 133. The nature of the circuit courts of appeals as intermediate appellate courts makes them 
a far more sensible target for certification than the federal district courts since the federal district 
courts cannot provide precedential proclamations on federal law.  
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reverse certification has focused on this proposal.134 In the most 
extensive discussion to date, Professor Andrew Bradt considers 
certification to the federal courts of appeals as a potential response to 
the increasing number of federal issues being resolved by state courts 
after the decision in Grable & Sons Metal Products v. Darue 
Engineering & Manufacturing.135 Some of the benefits and roadblocks 
considered by Bradt will be discussed below, alongside other benefits 
and challenges. This Section aims to discuss, in detail, reverse 
certification as a policy proposal. The advantages of reverse 
certification will be elucidated through the answers to three questions: 
(1) What would the benefits of reverse certification be?; (2) How 
would reverse certification work?; and (3) When would reverse 
certification be utilized? 
1. What Would the Benefits of Reverse Certification Be?  Although 
the motivations for allowing state courts to certify questions of federal 
law are slightly different than those animating certification of questions 
of state law, there is much overlap. The following discussion reveals 
that many of the institutional benefits of certification can be felt by 
state courts and federal courts alike, and litigants may reap some of the 
benefits as well. In general, the benefits of reverse certification can be 
separated into three different categories: judicial efficiency, 
uniformity, and comity. The first two benefits could be classified as 
practical and the third as symbolic. 
First, reverse certification would provide state courts with a tool 
for conserving judicial resources and allocating them more efficiently. 
Since certification is a discretionary tool that relies on courts being 
motivated to use it, this benefit cannot be understated. While state 
courts are often called upon to answer questions of federal law, some 
 
 134. From my review, only one scholar has suggested that the state courts should be able to 
certify questions to the Supreme Court, and, even then, only in a very limited capacity. See supra 
note 125. On the other hand, certification to the federal courts of appeals has been entertained 
on more occasions. See Bradt, supra note 29, at 1211 (“Although one could envision an argument 
that any federal certification process should be to only the U.S. Supreme Court, the courts of 
appeals would be superior tribunals for certification.”); Gugliuzza, supra note 37 (considering, in 
a footnote, whether allowing state courts to certify questions to the Federal Circuit could help 
break the “cycle of removal” in patent litigation). 
 135. Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005); see Bradt, supra 
note 29, at 1208 (“If part of the problem created by . . . wide-ranging discretion . . . to decline 
jurisdiction under Grable is that important federal questions are left to state tribunals, that 
problem could be mitigated by . . . allowing federal courts to answer those embedded questions, 
while keeping the entire case in state courts.”). 
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federal issues may be highly specialized and niche and may come to 
state courts only infrequently. Issues involving intellectual property 
law or complex federal statutes are possible examples. But certification 
would not merely be an opportunity for state courts to offload 
complicated questions onto the federal courts, it would allow for a 
more efficient allocation of judicial resources. Federal judges are more 
likely to be experienced in answering complex issues involving, for 
example, the interpretation of federal statutes. Thus, it is plausible to 
argue that such questions could be answered more efficiently by the 
federal courts,136 just as the state courts could be more efficient at 
answering questions of state law. Furthermore, as Bradt notes, making 
certification reciprocal might make certification more efficient 
overall.137 Both federal and state courts would have an incentive to 
swiftly answer questions certified to them, as they would want their 
own certified questions to be answered quickly in return.  
Second, reverse certification would advance the interests of 
litigants in the uniform resolution of federal issues. In the abstract, 
litigants may feel as if the resolution of a federal issue is more correct 
when adjudicated by a federal court.138 Litigants may also feel 
dissatisfied when a state court resolves a federal issue and a federal 
court later disagrees in a different case. Since reverse certification 
would allow more issues to be resolved in federal courts, it would help 
ameliorate both of these concerns. More concretely, reverse 
certification could reduce forum shopping by disincentivizing the use 
of artful pleading to avoid federal court resolution of federal issues, 
since the federal issues would have an additional pathway to reaching 
federal court. It may also lead to a more uniform administration of 
federal law overall by reducing the likelihood that there will be a split 
between a state court and a federal appellate court on any given federal 
issue. Furthermore, when the appellate court answers a certified 
question, its resolution of the issue would have precedential effect in 
 
 136. The efficiency gained here refers to the advantages federal courts have in resolving 
federal questions due to their experience and expertise. See sources cited supra note 33. 
Certification would not necessarily make the process more efficient for litigants since the process 
will inevitably be slowed by the procedural demands of certification.  
 137. See Bradt, supra note 29, at 1215 (“There may even be an incentive on the part of the 
courts of appeals to respond to certified questions expeditiously in hopes that they will benefit 
from similar treatment when certifying their own questions to the states.”). 
 138. But see Selya, supra note 36, at 690 (“[L]itigants do not have an entitlement to something 
identifiable in the abstract as a ‘right’ answer.”). 
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federal courts throughout the circuit;139 thus, reverse certification 
would provide the federal courts of appeals with additional 
opportunities to develop precedent that could be applied consistently 
to future litigants. 
Third, reverse certification would advance institutional comity 
between federal and state courts. As discussed above, certification of 
state law questions is in part motivated by the laborious task imposed 
on federal courts charged with resolving state law issues. However, the 
unilateral nature of certification may overvalue the resources of the 
federal courts and undervalue the resources of the state courts. The 
overwhelming size of the federal docket has been firmly established,140 
but state courts are faced with significant dockets as well.141 Proposals 
for reducing the federal docket often involve shifting more burdens 
onto the state courts.142 Similarly, unilateral certification allows federal 
courts to capitalize on state court labor without any analogous tool for 
states to request the help of the federal courts. There is a risk, then, 
that certification as currently practiced sends a message to the state 
courts that their time is less important. On the other hand, state courts 
retain discretion to reject certified questions, and the success of 
certification in some circuits implies that state courts are receptive to 
answering at least some state law questions that arise in federal cases.143 
And some circuits have made clear that the decision to certify should 
be motivated by deference and not the difficulty of answering state law 
questions.144 It might be more fair, though, for there to be some give 
and take in the certification process.145 A bilateral system of 
 
 139. See Bradt, supra note 29, at 1213 (“When the circuit court opines on a particular question, 
its opinion would become binding law throughout the circuit . . . .”). 
 140. See generally Peter S. Menell & Ryan Vacca, Revisiting and Confronting the Federal 
Judiciary Capacity “Crisis”: Charting a Path for Federal Judiciary Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 789, 
843–69 (2020) (collecting data concerning the growing dockets of the federal courts).  
 141. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., supra note 117 (reporting on case volumes in state 
courts). 
 142. See Jon O. Newman, 1,000 Judges—The Limit for an Effective Federal Judiciary, 76 
JUDICATURE 187, 194 (1992) (arguing in favor of allocating more cases to the state courts as an 
alternative to increasing the size of the federal judiciary); Calabresi, supra note 37, at 1297–98 
(proposing that a significant number of criminal cases be shifted to state courts to alleviate the 
federal docket). 
 143. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text (noting that several circuits have made use 
of certification and that states have been largely receptive). 
 144. Kremen v. Cohen, 325 F.3d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 145. Of course, nearly every state has passed a certification statute despite the fact that federal 
courts do not accept certified questions. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. The 
unilateral nature of the procedure has not dissuaded states from embracing it. 
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certification would emphasize that certification is motivated by 
deference and the efficient allocation of judicial resources, not merely 
the assistance of one court at the expense of the other.  
Relative to these benefits, the costs of a certification procedure 
can be minimized. There are several costs to consider: certification will 
add to the workload of the federal courts, create delays for litigants 
whose issues are certified, and raise possible federal constitutional 
concerns. The next Subsection will discuss how reverse certification 
might be structured as to reduce these costs.146 Following that, Section 
II.B.3, which discusses when reverse certification might be used, will 
argue that its discretionary use is unlikely to overburden the federal 
courts or substantially burden litigants.147 Finally, Part III of this Note 
will discuss constitutional concerns in greater detail.148 
2. How Would Reverse Certification Work?  Establishing a process 
for reverse certification would likely require legislative action by both 
the states and Congress. The states would probably need to enact 
legislation empowering their courts to certify questions, and Congress 
would likely need to enact a statute allowing the federal courts to 
receive and answer said questions.149 The multiplicity of state 
certification statutes shows that a statute can take many forms. In 
general, the state statutes specify three elements: (1) which courts can 
certify questions,150 (2) which courts can accept certified questions,151 
and (3) any other restrictions intended to calibrate the use of 
certification.152 A federal statute would need to contemplate these 
elements as well.  
As for which courts would be able to certify, a practical proposal 
would be to restrict certification to a state’s highest court. In some 
 
 146. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing how reverse certification might work). 
 147. See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing when reverse certification might be used). 
 148. See infra Part III (arguing that reverse certification would be constitutionally 
permissible). 
 149. See Bradt, supra note 29, at 1208 n.240 (opining that legislative action on behalf of both 
the States and Congress would be necessary to implement a reverse certification scheme). 
 150. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 2:12A-1 (specifying that questions may be certified to the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey only by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit). 
 151. See, e.g., WYO. R. APP. P. 11.01 (“The supreme court may answer questions of law 
certified to it . . . .”). 
 152. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 51-1A-3 (2021) (“The Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia may answer a question of law certified to it . . . if the answer may be determinative of an 
issue in a pending cause in the certifying court and if there is no controlling appellate decision, 
Constitutional provision or statute of this state.”). 
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cases, this may dilute the benefits of certification, as there would at 
times be two layers of discretion insulating a federal issue from review 
in federal court. However, it would be preferable to limit certification 
to a small number of courts; there would, after all, be courts from fifty 
different states, and possibly several territories, that would be 
empowered to certify questions. Restricting the power to certify 
questions to a state’s highest court would ensure that certification 
remains a relatively solemn affair. Furthermore, it would require a 
greater consensus of state judges to decide to certify, as courts of last 
resort typically have the largest panels of any court in a state.153 As 
discussed in Part II.A, it makes the most sense for federal questions to 
be certified to the courts of appeals. Given that, it is intuitive that a 
state court would be able to certify questions to the circuit within which 
it is geographically situated. For instance, the Supreme Court of 
California could certify questions to the Ninth Circuit, and so on.154  
Certification could be calibrated in other ways as well. A federal 
statute would likely require that the issue be unresolved and 
determinative in the case, as many state certification statutes do.155 It 
could also require that certified questions arise from a case that fulfills 
the requirements of Article III standing.156 The statute could also 
provide for supplemental briefing and oral argument by the parties, 
either as an option or a requirement.157 Congress could also use various 
tools to limit the use of certification. For example, Congress could set 
an amount-in-controversy requirement for certified questions.158 But 
 
 153. Yosh Halberstam, Trial and Error: Decision Reversal and Panel Size in State Courts, 32 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 94, 98 (2015). 
 154. That said, there are limited circumstances where it would be beneficial to allow the state 
courts to certify questions to other circuits as well. It would make sense, for example, to allow 
high courts from any state to certify a question of patent law to the Federal Circuit.  
 155. See supra note 152; CAL. R. CT. 8.548(a) (“[T]he Supreme Court may decide a question 
of California law if: (1) The decision could determine the outcome of a matter pending in the 
requesting court; and (2) There is no controlling precedent.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 
2021) (allowing certification only when the state law questions “are determinative of the said 
cause, and there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the Supreme Court of this 
state”). 
 156. See infra Part III.B (discussing the relationship between reverse certification and Article 
III standing). 
 157. Supreme Court Rule 19, the rule that enables the circuit courts of appeals to certify 
questions to the Supreme Court, requires the parties to submit briefs when a question is certified. 
See SUP. CT. R. 19(3) (“When a question is certified . . . the Clerk will submit the certificate to the 
Court for a preliminary examination to determine whether the case should be briefed, set for 
argument, or dismissed.”). 
 158. Such a limit might be undesirable, though. The amount in controversy in a litigation is 
not always a good measure for the complexity or importance of federal questions that may exist. 
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there is reason to believe that extensive statutory restrictions would not 
be necessary. Current certification practice suggests that state courts 
would develop doctrines that guide the decision to certify, and the 
federal courts would give feedback when accepting or dismissing 
certified questions.159 Thus, the courts would likely develop a mutual 
understanding regarding whether certification is appropriate in each 
case. Furthermore, the federal courts would be vigilant against any 
constitutional issues that may prevent the resolution of a particular 
certified question, such as a lack of Article III standing. 
There is an additional question regarding who within a circuit 
would decide to accept or dismiss a certified question. One possibility 
is that the initial question of whether to accept could be heard by a 
motions panel in the relevant circuit. If accepted, the certified question 
would then be sent to a merits panel for resolution of the legal issues. 
Or the initial inquiry and the merits could be resolved simultaneously. 
Certified questions could be assigned similar to routine appeals—one 
three-judge panel could make the decision whether to accept the 
certified question, and then that same panel would either issue an 
opinion answering the question or respond with a dismissal.160  
There are other ways certified questions could be reviewed as well. 
For example, Bradt posits that the circuit’s chief judge or an en banc 
panel could decide whether to accept a question.161 However, each of 
these alternatives has disadvantages. Leaving the decision to the chief 
judge of the circuit may give too much discretion to one judge, and it 
could risk overloading the chief judge’s already heavy administrative 
workload.162 And leaving decisions to en banc panels might be 
 
Many significant federal questions arise in circumstances where the monetary value of the 
litigation does not represent what is at stake. 
 159. See supra notes 105–108 and accompanying text (describing certification criteria 
developed by federal courts); supra note 111 (noting cases where state courts provided feedback 
to federal courts regarding certification).  
 160. It may be beneficial for a discretionary rejection to be accompanied by a brief opinion 
detailing the reasons for the rejection. The opinion could help guide state high courts in future 
decisions to certify. However, the state courts have not always been so helpful in explaining their 
reasons for rejecting a certified question. See Schneider, supra note 70, at 315–16 (“The Michigan 
Supreme Court, to say the least, is not very receptive to the certified question. Not only does the 
court refuse to answer most questions, but it generally fails to state the reasons for its refusal.”). 
 161. Bradt, supra note 29, at 1210 n.251. Bradt also proposes using a rotating three-judge 
panel, which is more akin to my proposal. Id. 
 162. Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Chief Judges: The Limits of Attitudinal Theory and 
Possible Paradox of Managerial Judging, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2008) (listing the 
administrative duties of a chief circuit judge and noting that the duties “often appear significant 
in their demand on a chief’s time”). 
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inefficient.163 Ultimately, different circuits could establish different 
procedures for dealing with certified questions that reflect the policy 
preferences of the circuit, unless Congress specifies a uniform 
procedure.164 
3. When Would Reverse Certification Be Utilized?  Even if reverse 
certification were available as a procedure, there might be a concern 
that it would not be used. Indeed, one might think that the lack of 
discussion on the topic evinces a lack of desire. One might also 
remember, though, that there was not a vocal desire among the federal 
courts for state certification. Florida’s pathbreaking certification 
statute lay dormant for fifteen years until the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided to take advantage, and certification is now a common 
practice.165 That said, there are plausible concerns regarding the 
attractiveness of reverse certification. State courts are commonly called 
upon to answer questions of federal law, and they generally do not have 
abstention doctrines that counsel deference to federal court decision-
making. Moreover, the federal courts have crushing dockets and might 
not be thrilled to open themselves to more work. The following 
discussion describes when state courts might want to certify questions 
and argues that federal courts would have incentives to answer. The 
value of reverse certification, however, does not depend on these 
instances occurring frequently. Even if used sparingly, reverse 
certification can be a valuable tool for courts and litigants. 
As previously discussed, state courts might want to certify when 
they are faced with complicated issues of federal law with which they 
have little interest. If the federal issue is one that infrequently arises in 
a state court, the court will likely have no precedent, and accordingly, 
there will be little benefit to building precedent. If the issue will be 
resolved by the federal courts nine times out of ten, or perhaps more, 
 
 163. The number of judges involved in an en banc proceeding can greatly increase the 
decision-making time and the expenditure of judicial resources. See Irving R. Kaufman, Do the 
Costs of the En Banc Proceeding Outweigh Its Advantages?, 69 JUDICATURE 7, 7 (1985) 
(describing the costs and delays caused by en banc proceedings). 
 164. The federal courts of appeals often diverge in administrative practices based on the 
policy goals of the circuit. See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and 
Case Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 368–73 (2011) (finding that 
nonuniformity in case-management practices among the circuit courts is in part due to differences 
in priorities among those courts). 
 165. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text (describing the historical roots of federal-
state certification); supra notes 92–99 and accompanying text (presenting data on the frequency 
of federal-state certification). 
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why not defer to the federal courts? Indeed, many state courts do defer 
to the federal courts of appeals by citing their decisions as persuasive 
authority and adopting their interpretations.166 If the state courts are 
willing to cite to the federal courts as persuasive authority for resolved 
federal issues, it is not a stretch to suggest that the state courts would 
be willing to defer to those same courts for unresolved federal issues. 
Certification would provide state courts with an opportunity to defer 
in such circumstances.  
Another factor that might motivate certification is the desire to 
avoid splits of authority. When called upon to resolve a question of 
federal law, state courts are especially reluctant to disrupt 
uniformity.167 In some circumstances, the state court may be convinced 
that its legal interpretation is correct and will be willing to disagree with 
the federal court.168 But when a state court has little interest in the 
resolution of a niche federal issue, it might prefer to use certification to 
allow the courts of appeals to battle over the correct interpretation.  
Furthermore, as has been alluded to above, the state courts might 
be motivated to certify in order to save time. State courts have busy 
dockets,169 and it might take greater than usual effort to resolve a 
complex federal issue for which little precedent exists. The state court 
might find certification to effectively conserve resources in such 
circumstances. Of course, the court’s desire to save time must also be 
balanced against the value of speedy and efficient justice. Some judges 
have pointed out that certification can significantly delay litigation.170 
A state court could balance these concerns by looking to the 
 
 166. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (providing examples of instances in which state 
courts followed federal decisions).  
 167. See State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enter., 984 N.E.2d 449, 464 (Ill. 2013) (“Because we 
find the goal of developing a uniform body of law to be important, we must accord more deference 
to federal court interpretations when those interpretations are unanimous.”); NASDAQ OMX 
PHLX, Inc. v. PennMont Sec., 52 A.3d 296, 303 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (“Whenever possible, 
Pennsylvania state courts follow the Third Circuit so that litigants do not improperly ‘walk across 
the street’ to achieve a different result in federal court than would be obtained in state court.”). 
 168. See, e.g., State Bank of Cherry, 984 N.E.2d at 464 (“[W]e may choose not to follow 
Seventh Circuit or uniform lower federal court precedent if we find that precedent to be wrongly 
decided because we determine the decision to be without logic or reason.”). 
 169. Supra note 117 and accompanying text.  
 170. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 394 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) 
(“[Certification] entails more delay and expense than would an ordinary decision of the state 
question on the merits by the federal court.”); Lindenberg v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins., 919 F.3d 992, 
994 (6th Cir. 2019) (Clay, J., concurring) (stating that resort to certification in diversity cases 
“serve[s] little purpose other than to needlessly delay resolution of the ultimate issues in the 
case”). 
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complexity of the issues and the length of the litigation up to that point. 
In some cases, one or both of the parties may prefer that the issues be 
certified, even if the procedure results in delays. Indeed, sometimes 
federal courts are moved to certify questions to the state courts by the 
litigants themselves.171 These litigants likely understand that 
certification may come with additional delay, but they have determined 
that it is worthwhile to have their state law claim adjudicated by a state 
forum. It is plausible that some litigants would have similar motivations 
in state court and would be willing to accept delays in return for limited 
access to a federal forum.  
There is a further question, though, of whether the federal courts 
would be willing to accept certified questions from the state courts. The 
near death of certification to the U.S. Supreme Court demonstrates 
that courts are reluctant to certify when the receiving court consistently 
refuses to answer.172 However, the federal courts of appeals may not be 
as hesitant to accept certified questions as some might expect. While it 
is true that the federal courts of appeals are not wanting for more 
work,173 certified questions are likely to present legal issues that the 
federal courts have a distinct interest in taking on. As has been 
discussed, certification would only be necessary in the case of 
unresolved and difficult federal issues, and certified questions would 
present federal judges with an opportunity to create new precedents 
for their circuits. Certification, if used efficiently,174 would provide 
federal judges with opportunities to answer questions that they are 
interested in answering: those that involve complex and novel issues of 
federal law. 
 
 171. One study examined the initiating activity leading to certified questions in three federal 
courts of appeals. Although certification by sua sponte order was more common, each circuit also 
certified questions on the motion of a party. CERTIFICATION IN THE THIRD, SIXTH, AND NINTH 
CIRCUITS, supra note 92, at 5, 7, 9.  
 172. See supra notes 56–61 and accompanying text (recounting how the Supreme Court’s 
persistent refusal to hear certified questions led to the death of certification).  
 173. The judicial commentary on crushing caseloads is extensive. See, e.g., Debra Cassens 
Weiss, Judges Tell of Case Delays, High Caseloads as House Committee Considers Expanding 
Judgeships, ABA J. (Feb. 25, 2021, 12:08 PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judges-
tell-of-case-delays-and-high-caseloads-as-house-committee-considers-expanding-judgeships 
[https://perma.cc/RYU7-8YQR] (providing recent examples of increased caseload volume); Jon 
O. Newman, The Current Challenge of Federal Court Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 905, 910–12 
(2020) (discussing the adverse consequences of increased caseload volume). 
 174. As it probably would be. See supra notes 109–112 and accompanying text (explaining 
that both federal and state courts have used judicial self-regulation in order to use certification 
more effectively). 
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Even so, it is difficult to predict how frequently reverse 
certification would be utilized. But, whatever the case may be, there 
are few downsides to simply making the tool available. If certification 
were used only sparingly by the state courts, then the tool might still be 
worthwhile in that small subset of cases that present complicated and 
unresolved federal issues. If certification were used too frequently, 
then the federal courts could react by tightening their criteria for 
accepting certified questions. The worst-case scenario would be if the 
federal courts tightened the criteria as to dissuade certification 
altogether, as the Supreme Court has done.175 Ultimately, however, the 
courts of appeals would have at least some incentives to accept and 
answer certified questions, and it cannot be easily presumed that the 
federal courts would reject them altogether.  
III.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REVERSE CERTIFICATION 
Now that the theoretical benefits of reverse certification have 
been discussed, there remains the critical issue of whether such a 
procedure could be implemented consistent with the Constitution. The 
scholars who have considered reverse certification question its 
consistency with Article III’s grant of judicial power.176 This Section 
considers the constitutional challenges to reverse certification and 
ultimately concludes that the procedure would be constitutional. Of 
course, federal courts would need to scrutinize certified questions to 
determine whether the federal issue is truly determinative and whether 
the underlying dispute qualifies as a case or controversy for Article III 
purposes.177 But this is nothing new—every case must be scrutinized to 
 
 175. See supra notes 56–61 and accompanying text (recounting how the Supreme Court’s 
persistent refusal to hear certified questions led to the death of certification); Nielson, supra note 
45, at 489 (describing how the Supreme Court discouraged the practice of certification through 
“[c]urt per curiam dismissals” (alteration in original) (quoting James William Moore & Allan D. 
Vestal, Present and Potential Role of Certification in Federal Appellate Procedure, 35 VA. L. REV. 
1,  22 n.87 (1949))). 
 176. See Selya, supra note 36 (“[F]ederal courts would likely resist the fiction that certified 
questions are not advisory opinions.”); Berman et al., supra note 37 (positing that reverse 
certification would “rais[e] difficult issues under Article III’s prohibition on advisory opinions”).  
 177. As Article III provides, 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, . . . to Controversies to which the United 
States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a 
State and Citizens of another State,—between Citizens of different States,—between 
Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and 
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
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answer preliminary issues of jurisdiction.178 A federal certification 
statute could easily specify that certified questions must arise from 
underlying cases that satisfy the requirements of Article III, or federal 
judges could make the inquiry themselves. This Part will first discuss 
concerns that certification would entail the issuance of advisory 
opinions. Following that, it will discuss concerns related to Article III 
standing. 
A. Advisory Opinions 
By and large, the most significant alleged defect of certification 
procedure is that it would require the federal courts to issue 
unconstitutional advisory opinions. This concern rests on two elements 
of certification procedure. First, an answer to a certified question may 
seem too many steps removed from a “case or controversy,”179 as it 
requires the federal courts to answer a discrete question extracted from 
a broader case. Second, there may be a concern that answers to 
certified questions are not sufficiently final, as they rely on state courts 
for implementation.  
In response to the first concern, Bradt argues that an answer to a 
certified question would be akin to a declaratory judgment, not an 
advisory opinion.180 Like a proper request for a declaratory judgment, 
a certified question asks a federal court to resolve “a discrete issue that 
is in actual, not theoretical, dispute.”181 In the declaratory judgment 
context, the Supreme Court has stated that a federal court opinion is 
not an advisory opinion “so long as the case retains the essentials of an 
adversary proceeding, involving a real, not a hypothetical, controversy, 
which is finally determined by the judgment below.”182 Thus, if state 
and federal courts appropriately screen certified questions to ensure 
that adversity, finality, and Article III standing are present, there will 
 
 178. Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453 (1900) (“On every writ of error 
or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of jurisdiction . . . [t]his question the court is 
bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise suggested . . . .”); see also Steel Co. 
v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998) (acknowledging that some cases “dilute[] 
the absolute purity of the rule that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question,” but 
nonetheless reaffirming the rule). 
 179. See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 (1974) (“The complaint failed to satisfy the 
threshold requirement imposed by Art. III of the Constitution that those who seek to invoke the 
power of federal courts must allege an actual case or controversy.”). 
 180. Bradt, supra note 29, at 1216. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 264 (1933). 
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be “a real, not a hypothetical” controversy for the federal courts to 
resolve. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has had the power to answer 
certified questions virtually from its inception.183 This power indicates 
that the extraction of a discrete question of law from a broader case is 
not problematic for the federal courts. It seems clear, then, that a 
certified question can appropriately be answered so long as the 
underlying case satisfies Article III requirements. 
That said, concerns related to finality could persist despite the 
character of the underlying dispute. The federal courts can screen 
certified questions to ensure that true adversity and standing are 
present, but they would rely on the state courts to render final decisions 
incorporating their answers. One might worry that state courts, who 
largely see themselves as not bound by lower federal court decisions,184 
could receive an answer to a certified question and simply disregard it. 
If state courts have discretion to disregard answers to certified 
questions, then those answers could be nonbinding advisory 
opinions.185 This would be odd given that the state court decided to 
certify the question in the first place. It could be argued that 
certification constitutes an implicit concession by the state court that 
the federal court decision will be final and that the federal court can 
rely on the “good faith” of the state court to follow its answer.186  
Relying on the good faith of state courts is not new. There is at 
least one other context where this happens: when the Supreme Court 
remands a case to a state court after delivering an opinion on the 
merits.187 Furthermore, Congress could possibly mandate in the 
 
 183. See supra Part I.A (describing the power of lower federal courts to certify questions to 
the Supreme Court and its historical background). 
 184. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 15 (describing the differing approaches of state courts toward 
using lower federal court precedent.). 
 185. See Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) (“Judgments 
within the powers vested in courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution may not lawfully 
be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by another Department of Government.”). But 
see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 570–71 (1962) (holding that the federal courts could rely 
on the “good faith” of the United States to honor money judgments rendered by the Court of 
Claims, even though Congress could hypothetically refuse to make an appropriation to fulfill 
judgments over a particular amount). 
 186. Zdanok, 370 U.S. at 571.  
 187. The Supreme Court continues to do this even though the state courts will at times evade 
the Court’s mandates. See generally Jerry K. Beatty, State Court Evasion of United States Supreme 
Court Mandates During the Last Decade of the Warren Court, 6 VAL. U. L. REV. 260 (1972) 
(examining instances where state courts exercised discretion on remand in a manner inconsistent 
with Supreme Court mandates).  
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certification statute that answers to certified questions are binding on 
the state courts despite the fact that they come from a lower federal 
court.188 But Congress would not necessarily need to mandate that 
answers to certified questions are binding as a matter of precedent. All 
that is needed to avoid a finality issue is that the federal court 
resolution of the federal issue be determinative between the parties in 
the case.189 Indeed, every federal court of appeals recognizes its own 
power to issue nonprecedential opinions.190 Although it might enhance 
reciprocity to give answers to certified questions precedential effect in 
the state courts, it would not be constitutionally necessary.  
B. Standing 
Standing is closely related to the prohibition of advisory opinions. 
If a federal court were to answer a certified question, the question 
would need to arise from an underlying case that qualifies as a “case or 
controversy” for the purposes of Article III. For an actual controversy 
to exist, the plaintiff in the underlying case would need to have had 
Article III standing to bring their original claim.191 This is important to 
note because many state courts have more relaxed standing 
requirements than the federal courts.192 Thus, a federal issue may make 
its way to a state’s highest court even though it would have never made 
it through a federal court’s front door. As a result, certification would 
be inappropriate in state cases presenting federal questions where the 
 
 188. It has been persuasively argued that Congress has the power to declare that the decisions 
of lower federal courts on issues of federal law are binding on the state courts. See Frost, supra 
note 15, at 81–83 (arguing that Congress could require state courts to follow precedent set by the 
lower federal courts pursuant to the Inferior Tribunals Clause, Art. I, § 8).  
 189. Finality is achieved when a judicial decision is the “last word” for a “particular case or 
controversy.” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995) (“Having achieved finality, 
however, a judicial decision becomes the last word of the judicial department with regard to a 
particular case or controversy.”).  
 190. See Merritt E. McAlister, “Downright Indifference”: Examining Unpublished Decisions 
in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 188 MICH. L. REV. 533, 549–51 (2020) (examining data regarding 
the use of nonprecedential unpublished opinions in all federal courts of appeals except for the 
Federal Circuit but noting that unpublished opinions are used in the Federal Circuit as well).  
 191. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[S]tanding is an essential 
and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”). There may be one 
small exception to this requirement, but it is doubtful. See infra note 193 (discussing the possible 
exception).  
 192. See Hershkoff, supra note 2, at 1836–37 (“State courts, however, are not bound by Article 
III, and . . . . [s]ome state courts issue advisory opinions, grant standing to taxpayers challenging 
misuse of public funds, and decide important public questions even when federal courts would 
consider the disputes moot.”).  
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requisites of Article III standing doctrine are not met.193 This is not 
fatal to reverse certification, but it does restrict its use.  
The variations in standing requirements may also impose 
additional burdens on federal courts answering certified questions, as 
they would need to be wary of the differing doctrines to conduct their 
own inquiry. That said, the system would likely exert pressure on the 
state courts to vet cases to avoid being denied for jurisdictional reasons. 
Furthermore, a federal certification statute could require state courts 
to include a statement of standing along with the certified question. Of 
course, a federal court would always have discretion to deny the 
certified question after conducting an independent inquiry, but such a 
requirement could ensure that state courts do some due diligence 
before certifying a question.  
CONCLUSION 
This Note paints a modest picture of reverse certification as a 
policy proposal by establishing that reverse certification would be both 
practically feasible and normatively attractive. Reverse certification 
would generate benefits for both courts and litigants and would 
enhance the symbolic parity of the state and federal courts. In the 
absence of significant downsides or constitutional concerns, reverse 
certification is a plausible expansion of an interjurisdictional procedure 
that has grown significantly in popularity in the past few decades. 
This Note does not, however, attempt to establish that Congress 
would be likely to create such a tool. It is notable, though, that 
certification of state law questions has gathered inertia, and 
certification in general will likely remain a common procedure in the 
federal judicial system. Lastly, while this Note has responded to 
criticisms against reverse certification, it does not tackle the criticisms 
of certification in general. This Note does not comprehensively defend 
certification, but rather argues that certification should be a two-way 
 
 193. There may be some limited circumstances, though, where federal courts could answer 
certified questions even if the plaintiff in the underlying case never had standing to bring the 
original claim. In ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, the U.S. Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction over a 
case on appeal from the Supreme Court of Arizona even though the “plaintiffs in the original 
action had no standing to sue under the principles governing the federal courts.” 490 U.S. 605, 
623 (1989). The Court reasoned that “we may exercise our jurisdiction on certiorari if the 
judgment of the state court causes direct, specific, and concrete injury to the parties who petition 
for our review.” Id. at 623–24. However, ASARCO may not extend to the certification context, 
as the Court expressly limited its reasoning to “jurisdiction on certiorari,” and specified that the 
state court judgment must injure the parties who petition the Supreme Court for review. Id. 
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street. In other words, since certification is here to stay, there are good 
reasons to consider making it reciprocal.  
 
